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The energy sector has represented a key target for the competition enforcement activities of the EU Commission
for a considerable time.  This activity has accompanied and in some cases followed the enactment of legislation
designed to liberalise the markets for the supply of gas and electricity, through the imposition of unbundling and
infrastructure sharing obligations on incumbents (often former state monopolists).  While sector specific
regulation has undoubtedly been effective in removing barriers to entry and in creating the conditions for a more
contestable market in many member states, it has not been wholly successful in curtailing the ability of
incumbents to seek to shape the conditions of competition on the retail markets in a way that could be detrimental
to newcomers, for instance by downgrading the conditions of access to the infrastructure or by seeking to tie
customers via long-term arrangements, not just on the retail market, but also at wholesale level.  Competition
decisions adopted since 2006 and addressed to major European former monopolists such as Distrigas in Belgium,
RWE and E.ON in Germany and EdF in France show that ex post competition enforcement is an indispensable
complement to sector regulation since it prevents the old monopolists, which invariably, at least for a time, are
dominant on their respective relevant markets, from countervail, via their commercial practices, many of the
positive effects of the liberalisation measures.
Yet, it appears that the road toward realising efficient, competitive markets in which energy is affordable as well as
secure is rather uphill.  The recent statement of objections issued bythe Commission against the Russian energy
company Gazprom (see http: //europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/937), alleging a
number of infringements of Article 102 TFEU, especially to the detriment of customers in Central and Eastern
European Member States, represents a good example of how "national champions", whether established within
the Union or, as is the case with Gazprom, in non-Member States, can act in such a way as to foreclose the energy
markets vis-a-vis rivals and thereby engender situations of dependency as regards supply in sizeable areas of the
single market.  
A very extensive and exhaustive run through the Gazprom investigation and related matters is provided by a
recent paper authored by Alan Riley, Professor of Law at City University and Fellow of CEPS at:
http://www.ceps.eu/book/commission-v-gazprom-antitrust-clash-decade.  As is well known, Gazprom stands
accused of partitioning markets, of applying "unfair prices" and of "preventing the diversification of the
consumption of gas", to the detriment of EU consumers, viaa number of prima facie illegitimate practices, such as
restricted access to the infrastructure (namely, the well known pipelines carrying gas from Central Russia and the
Caucasus to more Western parts of Europe); dowgraded levels of service in transporting gas to Central and
Eastern Europe; the practice of concluding long-term contracts of supply with a number of companies established
in several member states in this and other areas.
These allegations present a number of difficulties, especially in terms of evidence, for the Commission: taking the
allegation of "unfair pricing", this is admittedly fraught with problems.  For instance, how should an "equally
efficient" rival be identified? And how high (or low) should a price be to be "unfair"? As to the other allegation of
market partitioning this may admittedly be slightly easier to support with evidence: a careful analysis of pricing
trends across the Member States concerned, for instance, could give the Commission clues as to whether a similar
accusation is well founded.  But, assuming that the Commission is successful in gathering evidence and making a
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convincing case as to the existence of an infringement, could a prohibition decision, backed by fines, be the most
appropriate way of terminating the infringements? As may be easily recalled, Gazprom, given its economic
strength and, let's face it, its political adherences with the Putin regime, is admittedly notorious for the threats to
interrupt or restrict supply of gas.  This has already occurred a few years ago against a number of its key
customers (see e.g. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10362731). Accordingly, it could legitimately be questioned
whether taking such a "heavy handed" strategy may be helpful, especially since (as the example of Lithuania
shows-the country is 100% supplied by Gazprom) it would still be essential to maintain ties with the company in
question, at least until such time as alternative sources of energy, especially renewable, are found and developed
and thereby brought in a position of being capable of withstanding demand. 
As the experience emerging from the energy market study showed, commitments decisions, designed to put an
end to the anti-competitive practices under a degree of supervision, may represent an equally efficient response to
the consequences of unlawful behaviour.  However, this response presents inevitable risks, the first being the fact
that it would not be based on a conclusive finding of infringement and the second, and perhaps the most
significant, from a practical standpoint, being the fact that the efficacy of commitments decision relies heavily on
the ability of the competition authorities to monitor compliance with them.  Perhaps it could be wondered
whether the Commission would be better advised in "chancing" its way through a full-blown investigation
procedure, culminating with a "real" response to Gazprom's suspected unlawful practices. It is suggested that
taking this course of action would allow the Commission to exercise not just its detection powers, thus being able
to reach a definitive decision that an infringement has actually taken place.  It would also enjoy the power to
impose remedies on the investigated company, which would allow it to address the concerns identified already at
this preliminary stage, along with imposing financial penalties.  As Microsoft has demonstrated, Article 7 can be
deployed both flexibly and effectively to terminate the infringement as well as to allow rivals, who would
otherwise be foreclosed from the market as a result of the dominant undertaking's misdemeanours, to be put on a
more even footing in attempting to enter that market. Accordingly, it would definitely represent a more effective
response to the consequences of Gazprom's behaviour in particular as well as being consistent, more generally,
with the concerns for improving on openness and rivalry of the energy markets, goals in the realisation of which
the Commission has invested significant resources as well as political capital.
But alas, the woes for policy makers arising from the energy industry are not limited to the action of the European
Commission.  It appears that the UK Government, ostensibly out of a concern for growing gas and electricity
prices, is preparing to legislate in order to "force" energy suppliers to apply their "lowest" tariffs to their
customers' bills. At PM questions on 17 October the Prime Minister said: ""I can announce… that we will be
legislating so that energy companies have to give the lowest tariff to their customers, something that Labour didn't
do in 13 years, even though the leader of the Labour Party could have done because he had the job." (see:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19986929) 
However laudable the objectives of the PM may be (especially given the ongoing difficulties that many families
face in payihng their utility bills and the rising numbers of households in "fuel poverty"), this announcement rings
many alarm bells in the ears of any competition lawyer.  What is meant by "lowest tariffs"? According to which
benchmarks can this assessment be made? And secondly, how can it be ensured that, purportedly in order to fulfil
their obligation under the proposed Energy Bill, suppliers will not conspire in their determination of what is the
"lowest tariff"?
In respect to the first question, it is surely indispensable that suppliers should be "transparent" as to how their
tariffs are calculated so that customers can compare each offer and thereby make an informed choice as to which
firm to choose.  However, how in actual fact each tariff is determined remains very much within the gift of each
supplier and is therefore determined on the basis of confidential information.  Against this background, it is clear
that what appear to be "lowest tariffs"may not actually coincide with "competitive" tariffs, that is with the lowest
Cold winters loom large? From Gazprom to the war of words on tariffs ... http://www.clie.law.ed.ac.uk/2012/10/19/cold-winters-loom-large-from...
2 of 4 19/02/2015 15:51
prices that can be set having regard to the actual conditions of competition, of the size and number of rivals and of
any other relevant factor characterising the industry at a given time.  It could be added that such a scenatio brings
back to memory one of the most famous problems in competition law, namely the so-called "cellophane fallacy",
which, it was alleged, had marred the US Supreme Court decision in the DuPont case. Be as it may, it is surely
questioned whether imposing such a generalised obligation on suppliers, in the context of a market that is already
subjected to significant regulatio, is really likely to benefit consumers, as well as being objectively feasible.  To the
contrary, and coming to the second question highlighted above, the concern may well be raised that imposing
such a blanket obligation woul restrict competition between suppliers considerably, as well as pushing smaller
ones into a potentially unsustainable position of having to "meet competition" on the part of the major energy
companies by, in substance, ending up pricing almost at a loss. 
In a very recent blog post (see: http://competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2012/10/19/the-likely-effects-
of-compelling-energy-firms-to-give-customers-the-lowest-tariff/#more-790), Catherine Waddams, of the Centre
for Competition Policy at UEA, said: "Since any offer which a company made to try and encourage switching
would oblige them to lower all the charges they make to their established customers, we would not expect to see
very many offers.(…) A  small new competitor, with perhaps 100,000 consumers (less than half a percent of the
market), would face a cost of £2million from lost revenue with existing accounts if it offered a twenty pound
discount to attract new customers." Consequently, it could be argued that the obligation to bring all customers on
the "lowest" tariffs would not only repress competition on the retail market, by producing a "bird-mirror effect"
and thereby encouraging all energy suppliers on to a nigh to uniform price to their end users.  It would also be
detrimental to the commitment to encouraging new entrants in the industry: it may legitimately be expected that
any benefits arising from attracting new customers would be more than compensated with losses in revenue
which may be very difficult to offset, especially given the high fixed and wholesale supply costs associated with
energy production. 
In light of the above, it may be argued that the PM's announcement is at odds with the Government's commitment
to both a more diversified energy supply side and a wider pool of energy sellers more generally.  If this position,
with all the difficulties it is fraught with, is compounded with the Chancellor's retrenchment from the Exchequer's
financial support toward "green" energy, it is easy to see how some commentators may have been justified in
branding this latest Prime Ministerial announcement as"confused" (see for example, in the Guardian,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/oct/18/coalition-energy-policy-lowest-tariff?intcmp=239).
Thankfully for Mr Cameron, his Energy Minister was ready to "take it on the chin" and issue a rather more
anodyne statement on these issues (see http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/video/2012/oct/18/energy-
secretary-lowest-tariff-video?intcmp=239).  Ed Davey emphasised the pivotal role of competition among
suppliers and easier switching, the latter backed up by fuller information as to the competing offers available to
consumers and by safeguards against "abusive commercial practices" (such as those emerged from door-to-door
selling in the past), as the lynchpin of the energy market for the UK in the future.  However, he was silent as to the
obligation to bring all consumers on the lowest tariffs-something that could potentially be interpreted as a sign
that the PM's declaration had not formed the subject matter of deep cabinet discussion.  To all this the OFGEM
response, issued at 7am on 19 October, adds further colour (for a good sum up, one can refer to, inter alia,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2012/oct/19/energy-firms-customers-cheapest-tariff).  In a key that was not
verty different from that characterising the Minister's views, the sector regulator emphasised the need to have a
clearer, much more linear and easier to compare set of tariffs. The Office seeks to put an end to an excessively
wide variety of prices and to move toward simpler bills and up to 4 only tariff tiers.  OFGEM also plans to oblige
suppliers to inform customers as to the available tariffs and to bring to their attention any more advantageous
deal.  However, as is clear from its announcement (see http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/markets/retmkts
/rmr/consumers/pages/index.aspx?&utm_source=homepage&utm_medium=banner&
utm_campaign=simpler_clearer_fairer), it stops short of obliging suppliers, tout court, to "move" customers on
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to the lowest available rate-unless in the rather exceptional case of a "vulnerable" client whose tariff was "dead",
i.e. no longer on offer.
So, too much ado about nothing? It could be argued that Ofgem's announcement, together with the urgent answer
given by the junior Minister for Energy, John Hayes, to the Commons yesterday, confirm the existing
commitment to securing more effective competition on the energy market, via provision for simpler tariffs and
easier switching for individual users (see http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/oct/18/energy-minister-
cameron-hot-air?INTCMP=SRCH).   however, arguably this debate raises deeper questions for the existing
Government's energy policy: it would appear that energy is fast becoming another thug of war for the Cabinet, i.e.
another instrument for "grabbing headlines" and try to win over "easily" consensus via well-sounding but not very
thought through announcements, which require quick backtracks from other Ministers and, as is the case in
respect to energy prices, the energy regulator.  It is suggested that this view seems confirmed by the fact that
earlier today Mr Cameron, speaking from Brussels, far from either glossing over or indeed correcting his views on
this issue, chose to renew his commitment to the "switch to lowest tariff" solution, but only as part of the debate
concerning the new Energy Bill (see: http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2012/oct/18/david-cameron-energy-
bill-tariff-plan).  Admittedly, this does not promise very much for a debate that would require much clearer
direction and, more to the point, far stronger grounding in competition principles and evidence based policy- and
law-making.
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